Affect and Group Attachments: The Role of Shared Responsibility

This paper theorizes the role of shared responsibility in the development of affective group attachments, interweaving ideas from social exchange and social identity theories. The main arguments are that (1) people engaged in task interaction experience positive or negative emotions from those interactions; (2) tasks that promote more sense of shared responsibility across members lead people to attribute their individual emotions to groups or organizations; and (3) group attributions of own emotions are the basis for stronger or weaker group attachments. The paper suggests that social categorization and structural interdependence promote group attachments by producing task interactions that have positive emotional effects on those involved

Foreword

[Excerpt] This volume is designed to commemorate the distinguished history of the New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations at Cornell University, especially the various disciplines and fields that are inter-woven within its domain. For this book, many of those who have been a significant part of the ILR School’s history were invited to write a scholarly overview of some aspect of industrial and labor relations. These essays analyze developments in one or more of the various subfields in which many of the school’s alumni and faculty have been so active and prominent. The volume is being published by the ILR School on the occasion of the formal dedication of a new classroom and library complex

Relational Cohesion Theory

[Excerpt] Relational cohesion theory explains how and when people who are exchanging things of value develop stable, cohesive relations. It starts from the idea that people tend to interact or do things with others because they get something they value or want from those others. They give something to the other and receive something in return. This is termed a social exchange. The valued goods” that are exchanged may be tangible or intangible. Employees exchange their labor for pay, clients exchange money for services, neighbors exchange assistance with each other\u27s yards, coworkers exchange advice and information, roommates exchange respect for each other\u27s belongings, and friends exchange emotional support for each other

An Affect Theory of Social Exchange

This article develops a theory that explains how and when emotions, produced by social exchange, generate stronger or weaker ties to relations, groups, or networks. It is argued that social exchange produces positive or negative global feelings, which are internally rewarding or punishing. The theory indicates that social units (relations, groups, networks) are perceived as a source of these feelings, contingent on the degree of jointness in the exchange task. The jointness of the task is greatest if (1) actors find it difficult to distinguish their individual effects on or contributions to solving the exchange task (nonseparability) and (2) actors perceive a shared responsibility for success or failure at the exchange task. The theory explicates the effects of different exchange structures on these conditions and, in turn, on cohesion and solidarity. Implications are developed for network-to-group transformations

Role of Status in Group Processes

[Excerpt] This chapter organizes the other chapters of the volume around a fundamental status-affirmation principle, namely, that status differentials generate corresponding differences in performance expectations which, in turn, produce behaviors that affirm performance expectations. The chapters in this volume elaborate that proposition by showing how information exchange, patterns of privilege, and the accuracy of power perceptions reflect or strengthen the status-affirmation process. Several chapters also suggest conditions that forestall or weaken this process such as claims to expertise and communication styles. Other chapters can be construed as offering applications of the status-affirmation principle to the performance of corporate project teams and to the relationships between standard and nonstandard employees in the workplace. Overall, the chapters reflect the strength and vitality of the tradition of work on group processes

Power Processes in Bargaining

This is a theoretical article that integrates and extends a particular program of work on power in bargaining relationships. Power is conceptualized as a structurally based capability, and power use as tactical action falling within either conciliatory or hostile categories. The core propositions are (1) the greater the total amount of power in a relationship, the greater the use of conciliatory tactics and the lower the use of hostile tactics; and (2) an unequal power relationship fosters more use of hostile tactics and less use of conciliatory tactics than an equal power relationship. Distinct research on power dependence and bilateral deterrence provides support for both propositions. Implications are discussed for power struggle in ongoing relationships

The Impact of Status Differences on Coalitional Agreements: An Experimental Study

This experiment investigated the impact of status differences between subordinates and face-to-face coalition negotiations on insurgent coalitional action. The effects of these variables were examined in stratified groups, where a leader established inequitable pay-rates, and subordinates could coalesce and destroy a portion of the leader’s outcomes. The results showed that status differences (as opposed to status similarity) undermined the sense of common interests between subordinates and reduced the severity of coalitional action against the leader. Face-to-face negotiations engendered a more cautious approach to coalition negotiations and also reduced the severity of insurgent action. The results suggest that status differences pose an “organizational problem” for subordinates attempting to mobilize action against a leader

Bargaining and Influence in Conflict Situations

[Excerpt] This chapter examines bargaining as an influence process through which actors attempt to resolve a social conflict. Conflict occurs when two or more interdependent actors have incompatible preferences and perceive or anticipate resistance from each other (Blalock 1989; Kriesberg 1982). Bargaining is a basic form of goal-directed action that involves both intentions to influence and efforts by each actor to carry out these intentions. Tactics are verbal and/or nonverbal actions designed to maneuver oneself into a favorable position vis-a-vis another or to reach some accommodation. Our treatment of bargaining subsumes the concept of negotiation (see Morley and Stephenson 1977). This chapter is organized around a conceptual framework that distinguishes basic types of bargaining contexts. We begin by introducing the framework and then present an overview of and analyze theoretical and empirical work on each type of bargaining context

Structural Power and Emotional Processes in Negotiation: A Social Exchange Approach

This chapter focuses in the abstract on when and how repeated negotiations between the same actors foster positive feelings or emotions and, in turn, an affective commitment to their relationship. However, we have in mind applications to pivotal dyads within organizations and also to the emergence of friction” or stickiness” in market relations. Implicit in the idea that negotiations in pivotal dyads shape institutional patterns is the notion that repeated negotiations between the same two actors are likely to become more than instrumental ways for the particular actors to get work done. We suggest a simple process by which dyadic negotiations give rise to incipient affective commitments that make the relationship an expressive object of attachment in its own right. When such transformations occur, future negotiations are not just efforts to solve yet another concrete issue or problem that the particular actors face; they come to symbolize or express the existence of a positive, productive relationship. Commitments that have an emotional/affective component tend to make the exchange relation an objective reality with intrinsic value to actors. In Berger and Luckmann\u27s (1967) terms, the relation becomes a third force.

Metatheory and Friendly Competition in Theory Growth: The Case of Power Processes in Bargaining

[Excerpt] This paper analyzes the theoretical development taking place in a program of research on power processes in bargaining (see Bacharach and Lawler 1976, 1980, 1981a, 1981b; Lawler and Bacharach 1976, 1979, 1987; Lawler, Ford, and Blegen 1988; Lawler and Yoon 1990; Lawler 1986, 1992). The theoretical program takes as its starting point a situation where individuals, groups, organizations, or even societies with conflicting interests voluntarily enter into explicit bargaining. Explicit (as opposed to tacit) bargaining assumes the mutual acknowledgment of negotiations, conflicting issues along which compromise is possible, and open lines of communication through which parties can exchange offers and counteroffers in an attempt to resolve the issues that divide them (Schelling 1960; Bacharach and Lawler 1980; Boyle and Lawler 1991). The scope of this theoretical research program assumes further that the parties have a power capability, that they use this power tactically in an effort to achieve desired outcomes, and that they strive for a favorable position during the bargaining process